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Summary of Papers Presented at the Conference 
‘‘Models and Monetary Policy: Research in the 
Tradition of Dale Henderson, Richard Porter, 
and Peter Tinsley’’ 
Jon Faust, of the Board’s Division of International 
Finance;  Athanasios  Orphanides,  of  the  Board’s 
Division  of  Monetary  Affairs;  and  David  L.  Reif­
schneider, of the Board’s Division of Research and 
Statistics, prepared this article. 
On  March  26  and  27,  2004,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board held a conference in Washington, D.C., on the 
application  of  economic  models  to  the  analysis  of 
monetary policy issues. The papers presented at the 
conference  addressed  several  topics  that,  because 
they are of interest to central bankers, have been a 
prominent feature of Federal Reserve research over 
the years. In particular, the papers represent research 
in  the  tradition  of  work  carried  out  over  the  past 
thirty-ﬁve  years  at  the  Federal  Reserve  by  three 
prominent  staff  economists—Dale  W.  Henderson, 
Richard D. Porter, and Peter A. Tinsley. Thus, the 
conference partly served as a celebration of the con­
tributions made by these individuals to policy-related 
research since the late 1960s. 
Among the speciﬁc topics addressed at the confer­
ence were the inﬂuence of uncertainty on policymak­
ing; the design of formal rules to guide policy actions; 
the role of money in the transmission of monetary 
policy; the determination of asset prices; and econo­
metric techniques for estimating dynamic models of 
the economy. This summary discusses the papers in 
the order presented at the conference.1 
1.  The  conference  sessions  also  included  a  panel  consisting  of 
Ben S. Bernanke, William Poole, and John B. Taylor, who discussed 
the  current  state  of  central  bank  research  and  likely  directions  for 
future work. A list of the conference papers appears at the end of this 
article along with an alphabetical list of authors and their afﬁliations at 
the time of the conference. For a limited period, the papers will be 
available  at  www.federalreserve.gov/events/conferences/mmp2004/ 
program.htm. In early 2005, the Federal Reserve Board will publish a 
conference volume that will include a revised version of each confer­
ence paper, commentaries on each paper by the conference discus­
sants,  and  an  appreciation  summarizing  the  careers  of  Henderson, 
Porter, and Tinsley. 
LARS PETER HANSEN AND THOMAS J. SARGENT 
One  way  that  economists  gain  insights  about  how 
to make sound economic decisions in an uncertain 
world  is  to  study  simple  problems  in  which  the 
optimal  way  to  behave  can  be  unambiguously 
derived. In the 1950s, Herbert Simon and Henri Theil 
derived a simple principle that has been central to 
the study of economic decisionmaking under uncer-
tainty.2 Under their assumptions, they show that the 
optimal choice under uncertainty can be derived in 
two steps: First, form your best forecast of the rele­
vant  unknown  variables,  and  second,  act  as  you 
would if you were certain that your forecast would 
come true. This result has come to be known as the 
certainty-equivalence principle: Once one forms the 
best forecast of future conditions, the nature and the 
degree of uncertainty play no further role in decision-
making. As might be expected, certainty equivalence 
applies  only  under  very  restrictive  conditions,  and 
economists have extensively studied cases in which 
the certainty-equivalence principle does not generate 
the  best  possible  decisions.  Nonetheless,  certainty 
equivalence  remains  an  important  benchmark  case 
to consider and has proven extremely useful both in 
understanding  more-complicated  theoretical  cases 
and in thinking about real-world problems. 
A  critical  assumption  underlying  the  certainty-
equivalence principle is that decisionmakers, be they 
households,  ﬁrms,  or  policymakers,  know  the  true 
model of the economy. No one knows, of course, the 
full, true nature of the economy. Thus, households, 
ﬁrms, and policymakers may ﬁnd it appropriate to 
take this uncertainty into account in deciding how to 
act. In ‘‘‘Certainty Equivalence’ and ‘Model Uncer­
tainty’,’’ Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent 
consider  economic  decisionmaking  under  model 
2.  Herbert Simon (1956), ‘‘Dynamic Programming under Uncer­
tainty with a Quadratic Criterion Function,’’ Econometrica,v ol.2 4, 
pp. 74–81; and Henri Theil (1957), ‘‘A Note on Certainty Equivalence 
in Dynamic Planning,’’ Econometrica, vol. 25, pp. 346–49. 290  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
uncertainty.  In  their  paper,  the  decisionmaker  does 
not know the true model of the economy but knows 
only a set of models containing the true model. The 
authors’  approach  differs  from  Bayesian  decision 
theory, in which the decisionmaker assigns to each 
model a probability that it is the true one and then 
chooses  the  decision  that  is  the  best  response  on 
average  across  all  the  competing  models.  Instead, 
Hansen and Sargent consider a form of ‘‘robust deci­
sionmaking’’  in  which  the  decisionmaker  chooses 
the decision that maximizes his or her welfare in the 
worst-case  scenario—that  is,  when  the  true  model 
turns out to be the worst possible model from the 
standpoint  of  the  agent.  Robust  decisionmaking  is 
quite complicated, especially if what happens to be 
the worst-case model depends on which decision the 
agent chooses. 
The  paper  shows  that,  even  under  this  cautious 
approach  to  taking  account  of  model  uncertainty, 
a  surprising  and  useful  version  of  the  certainty-
equivalence  principle  prevails.  Once  again,  the 
optimal  decision  under  uncertainty  can  be  seen  as 
the solution of an equivalent problem under certainty. 
In this case, however, one does not take as certain 
the best objective forecast of the relevant variables; 
rather, the forecast is ‘‘tilted’’  or ‘‘twisted’’  in a par­
ticular way to reﬂect the agent’s desire to minimize 
suffering if the worst-case model prevails. The results 
of the paper shed light on the nature of the cautious 
behavior induced by the desire for decisions that are 
robust in this way. 
The  paper  also  provides  important  insights  into 
the way to analyze this sort of decisionmaking. The 
solution is cast as the result of an imaginary two-
player  game  in  which  a  ﬁctional  opposing  player 
maliciously chooses the worst possible model for the 
agent. Further, the paper shows that the robust deci­
sionmaking can be interpreted as a form of Bayesian 
decisionmaking in which, once again, the probabili­
ties of outcomes are twisted in a particular way to 
reﬂect the desire for robustness. 
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 
The pervasive nature of structural change in the econ­
omy presents a great challenge for macroeconomic 
modeling  and  policy  analysis,  in  no  small  part 
because it signiﬁcantly complicates the estimation of 
the data-generating processes of key unobserved vari­
ables, such as the natural rates of interest and unem­
ployment.  Traditionally,  evaluating  macroeconomic 
policy  using  econometrics  has  involved  two  steps. 
The ﬁrst step tackles the estimation of a model of the 
economy, including the unobserved natural rates of 
interest and unemployment. In the second step, the 
best policy is selected by employing the estimated 
model and natural rate variables as if they were free 
of  estimation  error.  This  two-step  approach  has 
proven attractive because separating model estima­
tion from policy selection simpliﬁes analysis. Under 
certain strong assumptions, the certainty-equivalence 
principle suggests that one can ﬁnd the best policy 
by  ﬁrst  modeling  key  variables  and  then  choosing 
the policy as if the model’s forecasts were certain to 
come true.3 
Because  the  certainty-equivalence  principle 
assumes knowledge of the true model of the econ­
omy, it implies precise knowledge of the equations 
determining unobserved variables such as the natural 
rates  of  interest  and  unemployment,  a  requirement 
that is surely not satisﬁed in the case of monetary 
policymaking.  The  uncertainty  regarding  modeling 
these natural rates has many sources, but one of the 
most important seems to be the presence of structural 
change in the macroeconomy. 
In ‘‘Robust Estimation and Monetary Policy with 
Unobserved Structural Change,’’  John  C. Williams 
examines,  through  an  estimated  model  of  the  U.S. 
economy, the quantitative signiﬁcance of structural 
change for the implementation of monetary policy. 
Williams  ﬁrst  documents  the  considerable  uncer­
tainty  associated  with  modeling  the  natural  rates 
of interest and unemployment. The data are insufﬁ­
ciently  informative  to  allow  a  clear  choice  among 
alternative estimated models for either natural rate. 
Importantly, as Williams shows, the policy suggested 
by  applying  the  certainty-equivalence  principle  to 
one  of  these  models  often  will  lead  to  very  poor 
policy outcomes if one of the other models happens 
to be true. The problem seems to arise mainly from 
the differences in the natural rate models. The costs 
of improperly ignoring uncertainty about the natural 
rates are especially pronounced in terms of the vari­
ability of inﬂation. The certainty-equivalent policies 
suggest that policymakers have considerable ability 
to limit ﬂuctuations in both output and inﬂation, but 
this  result  seems  to  rest  heavily  on  the  model  in 
question being exactly correct. When applied in other 
models that ﬁt the data about as well, the suggested 
policies are often far from optimal. 
In light of his ﬁnding, Williams investigates alter-
native  solutions  to  the  joint  problem  of  estimation 
and policy feedback in the presence of uncertainty 
about  how  to  model  the  natural  rates  of  interest 
3.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  ﬁrst  step  involves  forming  a  ‘‘best 
forecast’’  of key variables. Under standard assumptions, that forecast 
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and unemployment. He identiﬁes strategies that are 
robust  in  the  sense  of  providing  very  good  policy 
outcomes no matter which model is correct. He ﬁnds 
that estimating these natural rates using simple esti­
mators such as weighted averages of sample means 
performs well for the purpose of formulating robust 
policy. He also ﬁnds that, with these estimators, the 
optimal policy under uncertainty incorporates a sig­
niﬁcant  degree  of  policy  inertia—that  is,  a  depen­
dence of the current interest rate setting on its value 
in  the  previous  period—and  responds  less  aggres­
sively  to  perceived  unemployment  gaps  than  cer­
tainty equivalence would suggest. Finally, he shows 
that adopting this joint estimation and control proce­
dure proves highly effective at mitigating the effects 
of misspeciﬁcation and mismeasurement of the natu­
ral rates of interest and unemployment. 
JEFFREY C. FUHRER AND GIOVANNI P.  OLIVEI 
Understanding  why  important  economic  indicators 
such as unemployment, output, and inﬂation gradu­
ally rise and fall over the business cycle is of central 
importance to many macroeconomic issues, includ­
ing the optimal conduct of monetary policy. At least 
since  the  work  of  John  Maynard  Keynes,  macro-
economists have debated the business-cycle role of 
‘‘sticky’’  prices  and  wages—prices  and  wages  that 
respond  only  sluggishly  to  new  conditions.  Sticky 
prices  have  the  potential  to  give  a  special  role  to 
expectations of future economic conditions. If, say, a 
manufacturer is going to post and maintain a price for 
an extended period, he or she needs to take account 
of not only current conditions but also the conditions 
expected  to  prevail  over  the  extended  period.  The 
nature and the degree of such forward-looking price-
setting behavior have important consequences for an 
understanding of the optimal response of monetary 
policy  to  the  business  cycle;  hence,  building  an 
empirical model that provides a realistic account of 
the way expectations feed into prices and wages is a 
critical—and hotly debated—area of research. 
The  central  issue  in  this  research  concerns  the 
degree to which price setters look to the future. Are 
they inertial, that is, focused on current or past con­
ditions? Or are they mainly forward looking, that is, 
focused on projected conditions in the period over 
which  the  price  will  hold?  The  difﬁculty  in  this 
literature is that, in either case, current prices could 
explain future prices. In the inertial explanation, cur-
rent prices are a fairly direct determinant of future 
prices. Under the forward-looking explanation, last 
month’s  prices  explain  next  month’s  because  past 
prices are a good predictor of future prices. If pricing 
behavior  is  somewhat  inertial,  both  these  explana­
tions are likely to be correct, and sorting out their 
relative importance raises subtle econometric issues. 
Clearly,  if  one  can  ﬁnd  economic  variables  that 
behave  very  differently  depending  on  which  case 
is  correct,  these  variables  can  be  used  to  help 
settle the issue. Econometricians call such variables 
instruments.4 
In ‘‘Estimating Forward-Looking Euler Equations 
with  GMM  Estimators:  An  Optimal  Instruments 
Approach,’’  Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Giovanni P. Olivei 
compare different methods for choosing instrumental 
variables in the estimation of forward-looking output 
and inﬂation equations.5 They follow earlier work in 
showing that the instrumental variables used in con­
ventional estimation of such equations are weak—the 
behavior of the instruments in the forward-looking 
case do not differ much from that in the inertial case. 
To  mitigate  this  problem,  the  authors  propose  an 
estimation procedure based on instrumental variables 
that exploits more completely the differential predic­
tions of the two theories.6 They call this procedure an 
‘‘optimal instruments’’ approach and show that it has 
some desirable statistical properties (for example, it 
shares some of the properties of maximum-likelihood 
estimation). The authors use computer simulations to 
show that the new approach substantially resolves the 
weak-instruments problem and that, in contrast with 
the conventional method, the estimates of key param­
eters obtained using the new method tend to be about 
right  on  average.  Further,  the  optimal-instruments 
method provides a more stringent test of the hypoth­
esis of forward-looking behavior because the method 
more  completely  assesses  the  predictions  of  the 
model. 
The  authors  show,  through  simulations,  that  the 
estimates  made  with  the  optimal-instruments 
approach should be more reliable than those made 
with  conventional  techniques;  then  they  apply  the 
method to equations for output and for inﬂation using 
U.S.  data.  For  both  relations,  the  estimates  using 
the  new  method  indicate  a  much  larger  inertial 
component,  and  hence  a  smaller  role  for  forward-
4.  To  clearly  resolve  which  theory  is  correct,  econometricians 
need variables that meet certain conditions for valid instruments. In 
the current case, the goal is to estimate the role of expected future 
conditions—as opposed to recent past conditions—in setting prices. 
Because price expectations are not directly observed in the economy, a 
useful instrumental variable would, say, rise when price expectations 
rise for reasons other than a rise in current prices. 
5.  GMM is the abbreviation for general method of moments. 
6.  More  formally,  the  instruments  are  based  on  imposing  the 
restrictions  of  the  forward-looking  model  regarding  how  current 
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In  ‘‘Optimal  Stabilization  Policy  when  Wages  and 
Prices Are Sticky: The Case of a Distorted Steady 
State,’’  Pierpaolo  Benigno  and  Michael  Woodford 
consider the optimal design of monetary policy when 
both prices and wages display considerable inertia. 
The authors are especially interested in whether the 
recent  ﬁndings  of  Christopher  J.  Erceg,  Dale  W. 
Henderson, and Andrew T. Levin hold in the context 
of a more general model of the economy.7  In their 
model,  Erceg,  Henderson,  and  Levin  assumed  the 
existence  of  output  and  employment  subsidies  that 
eliminate  any  distortions  arising  from  the  market 
power  of  monopolistically  competitive  ﬁrms.  As  a 
result, a monetary policy that stabilizes prices yields 
a steady-state level of output that is efﬁcient. Benigno 
and Woodford point out, however, that the property 
of efﬁciency does not hold in the absence of such 
subsidies.  Under  more-realistic  assumptions  about 
subsidies and taxes, stabilization policy will inﬂuence 
not only the steady-state variability of wages, prices, 
and output but also the average equilibrium levels of 
these factors. Thus, optimal monetary policy under 
these more-general conditions involves a more com­
plicated set of tradeoffs and may imply central bank 
behavior that differs signiﬁcantly from that derived 
from a simpler model. 
To investigate this possibility, Benigno and Wood-
ford  extend  the  analysis  of  Erceg,  Henderson,  and 
Levin  by  using  a  model  in  which  the  steady-state 
level of output under a zero-inﬂation policy is sub-
optimal because of tax distortions and market power. 
Like the previous researchers, Benigno and Wood-
ford ﬁnd that the expected utility of the representative 
household can be approximated by a quadratic loss 
function with no linear terms, a result implying that 
the welfare associated with a given policy rule can 
still be readily evaluated (to second-order accuracy) 
using  a  ﬁrst-order-accurate  solution  of  the  model. 
Also, they continue to ﬁnd that the welfare-theoretic 
loss function has three terms capturing the distortions 
arising from nonzero levels of wage inﬂation, price 
inﬂation, and an appropriately deﬁned measure of the 
output gap. 
7.  Christopher J. Erceg, Dale W. Henderson, and Andrew T. Levin 
(2000), ‘‘Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage and Price 
Contracts,’’  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  vol.  46  (October), 
pp. 281–313. 
The  existence  of  a  distorted  steady  state  in  the 
more-general  model,  however,  does  inﬂuence  the 
weight  placed  on  each  of  the  three  objectives.  In 
addition, tax distortions and market power alter the 
deﬁnition of target output used to compute the output 
gap,  thereby  causing  the  target  rate  of  output  to 
diverge from the equilibrium output level that would 
obtain  under  fully  ﬂexible  wages  and  prices.  As  a 
result, the simple policy rules of the sort that Erceg, 
Henderson, and Levin considered—that is, rules that 
stabilize a weighted average of wage and price inﬂa­
tion with no reference to the output gap, or rules that 
stabilize  a  weighted  average  of  price  inﬂation  and 
the output gap with no reference to wages—appear to 
be poorer in their approximation of the fully optimal 
strategy. 
Nonetheless, Benigno and Woodford ﬁnd that the 
main conclusion of the earlier work remains valid: 
If wages are sticky, then variations in wages give rise 
to distortions similar to those caused by variations 
in sticky prices, and monetary policy should act to 
mitigate welfare losses associated with both factors. 
Under  such  circumstances,  targeting  price  inﬂation 
alone  will  be  suboptimal,  and  appreciable  welfare 
gains will ensue from targeting prices, wages, and the 
output gap. 
MATTHEW B. CANZONERI,R OBERT E. CUMBY, 
AND BEHZAD T.  DIBA 
Since  the  early  1990s,  many  central  banks  have 
adopted price inﬂation targeting as a framework for 
implementing  monetary  policy.  Although  central 
banks have chosen this strategy for various reasons, 
the literature on monetary policy design suggests one 
motivation:  avoiding  persistent  movements  in  the 
price level, which give rise to economic distortions 
that reduce the welfare of households. This reduction 
in welfare arises in the context of a class of models 
that economists often use to characterize the work­
ings of the economy—the so-called New Neoclassi­
cal Synthesis (NNS). If prices exhibit signiﬁcant iner­
tia, policymakers avoid the loss of household welfare 
in  an  optimal  way  if  they  ﬁx  the  aggregate  price 
level. However, the recent work of Erceg, Henderson, 
and Levin has called this conclusion into question.8 
In particular, their ﬁndings suggest that if the NNS 
model is generalized to allow for inertia in nominal 
wages,  then,  by  targeting  prices  alone,  the  central 
bank no longer maximizes consumer welfare. To do 
so,  it  must  instead  respond  to  movements  in  both 
8.  Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, ‘‘Optimal Monetary Policy.’’ Summary of Papers Presented at the Conference ‘‘Models and Monetary Policy’’  293 
prices and nominal wages or to movements in prices 
and  one  of  the  main  determinants  of  wages,  the 
output gap. 
In ‘‘Price and Wage Inﬂation Targeting: Variations 
on  a  Theme  by  Erceg,  Henderson,  and  Levin,’’ 
Matthew  B.  Canzoneri,  Robert  E.  Cumby,  and 
Behzad  T.  Diba  expand  upon  this  recent  work  by 
investigating the potential beneﬁts of targeting both 
prices  and  nominal  wages.  They  use  the  standard 
NNS model to see how social welfare is inﬂuenced 
by the adoption of different monetary policy rules for 
responding to macroeconomic disturbances. They use 
variations  of  the  NSS  model  to  determine  which 
aspects of the economy have an important bearing 
on the relative merits of price and wage targeting. 
Among  the  variations  are  speciﬁcations  with  and 
without distortions arising from monopolistic compe­
tition; speciﬁcations with different treatments of capi­
tal and its role in the production process; and speci­
ﬁcations  that  allow  for  random  disturbances  to 
consumer spending and for productivity shocks. 
Canzoneri,  Cumby,  and  Diba  derive  three  main 
conclusions from their analysis. First, they ﬁnd that 
incorporating capital into the model has a signiﬁcant 
quantitative effect on their results. The way in which 
capital enters the model appears to be less important, 
however; in particular, making the sale of existing 
capital uneconomic, a move implying that existing 
capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, does not have large normative 
implications.  Second,  under  a  policy  that  adjusts 
interest rates to inﬂation prospects alone, a level of 
price ﬂuctuation exists below which rate tightening 
does not pay. In contrast, under a policy that targets 
only wages, the tighter the targeting rule, the better. 
Third,  and  perhaps  most  surprising,  a  policy  of 
aggressively targeting nominal wages leads to better 
outcomes than a policy of targeting only price inﬂa­
tion. For example, for a particular speciﬁcation of the 
economic  model,  targeting  price  inﬂation  imposes 
welfare  costs  that  are  greater  than  those  imposed 
by  a  wage-targeting  strategy  designed  to  yield  the 
same volatility of price inﬂation. Finally, Canzoneri, 
Cumby,  and  Diba  ﬁnd  that  hybrid  rules—those  in 
which interest rates respond to movements in both 
prices and wages—do not lead to much better policy 
outcomes than does a policy of aggressively targeting 
nominal wages, a ﬁnding that contrasts with previous 
ﬁndings in this ﬁeld. 
BENNETT T.  MCCALLUM AND EDWARD NELSON 
In  their  paper  ‘‘Targeting  vs.  Instrument  Rules  for 
Monetary Policy,’’ Bennett T. McCallum and Edward 
Nelson compare alternative ways to characterize rule-
based monetary policy. Traditionally, the term mone­
tary policy rule has been used in the sense of ‘‘instru­
ment rules’’—speciﬁc formulas for setting the federal 
funds rate, money growth, or some other controllable 
instrument  in  response  to  current  economic  condi­
tions, as measured by recent data or forecasts. How-
ever, in the ongoing debate regarding the best way to 
characterize  rule-based  monetary  policy,  so-called 
targeting  rules  have  been  proposed  as  an  alterna­
tive. Unlike instrument rules, targeting rules do not 
describe explicitly how the policy instrument must be 
set. Rather, they convey the implicit prescription that 
policy must attain the policymaker’s objective. 
Two  variants  of  these  implicit  rules  have  been 
suggested.  A  general  targeting  rule  describes  the 
speciﬁcation of a central bank’s objective function, 
whereas a speciﬁc targeting rule is a description of 
optimal policy behavior derived from both the central 
bank’s objective function and a model of the econ-
omy.9  With  regard  to  the  general  targeting  rule, 
McCallum  and  Nelson  argue  that  referring  to  the 
speciﬁcation of the policymaker’s objective as a rule 
seems inappropriate. Instead, they think that clearly 
distinguishing between the terms objectives and rules 
is useful in policy analysis. 
McCallum and Nelson examine in detail the spe­
ciﬁc targeting rules approach and compare it with the 
instrument-rules approach. Because speciﬁc targeting 
rules are, by deﬁnition, optimality conditions, their 
implicit policy prescriptions might seem better suited 
for describing optimal policy, such as the optimal-
control  approach  to  monetary  policy  design.  As 
McCallum and Nelson point out, however, conditions 
that imply optimality in one model may be highly 
inappropriate in other speciﬁcations, as is the case 
with any optimal-control exercise. The optimality of 
the  suggested  solution  is  conditioned  on  accepting 
the  assumed  model  structure  as  true  beyond  any 
doubt,  a  stance  that  is  untenable  in  light  of  the 
ongoing  dispute  among  economists  concerning  the 
proper  speciﬁcation  of  a  model  for  the  macro-
economy.  Thus,  McCallum  and  Nelson  argue  in 
favor of the traditional policy rules analysis, which 
attempts to identify simple rules that are robust to 
alternative model speciﬁcations. 
The authors examine some possible limitations of 
simple rules that have sometimes been cited as argu­
ments in favor of speciﬁc targeting rules: (1) Simple 
rules may omit from consideration important factors 
not included in the rule, (2) they may require judg-
9.  The description of the optimal behavior generally comes in the 
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mental adjustments, (3) they cannot be seen as once-
and-for-all commitments because they must allow for 
modiﬁcations reﬂecting improvements to our knowl­
edge,  and  (4)  they  may  not  accurately  reﬂect  the 
current  practice  of  central  banks.  After  examining 
these  limitations  in  detail,  McCallum  and  Nelson 
conclude  that  they  do  not  present  any  compelling 
argument  for  preferring  the  speciﬁc  targeting  rules 
approach over the traditional policy rules analysis. In 
addition, McCallum and Nelson conduct several ana­
lytical exercises to examine whether implementation 
of targeting rules might result in lower interest rate 
variability  relative  to  that  associated  with  simple 
instrument rules. They show that, in their framework, 
once  the  relevant  policy  implementation  errors  for 
the two alternative approaches are properly accounted 
for, targeting rules generally result in greater interest 
rate variability. 
DAVID L. KELLY AND STEPHEN F.  LEROY 
The concept of liquidity plays a central role in the 
understanding  of  asset  markets.  One  commonly 
thinks  of  money  as  the  most  liquid  asset  and  of 
physical assets such as factories and houses as very 
illiquid.  However,  formal  modeling  of  the  features 
that make some assets more liquid than others has 
proven very difﬁcult. Although everyone may agree 
that an asset is illiquid if it is difﬁcult, costly, or time 
consuming to sell at a price close to its fair market 
value, the precise meanings of ‘‘difﬁcult’’ and ‘‘fair’’ 
are not obvious in this context. Economists often use 
the term frictions to describe the collection of factors 
that make some assets less liquid than others. In part 
because modeling these frictions has proven so difﬁ­
cult, an important branch of research in macroeco­
nomics omits them or treats them in an elementary 
manner. Under standard simpliﬁcations, for example, 
monetary policy makers can ignore the fact that facto­
ries are less liquid than Treasury bills. 
In  ‘‘Liquidity  and  Fire  Sales,’’  David  L.  Kelly 
and Stephen F. LeRoy study one familiar aspect of 
liquidity—the fact that, for certain illiquid assets, the 
price they could fetch if the seller had to sell imme­
diately might be considerably below what the assets 
could fetch if the seller waited for ‘‘the right’’  buyer. 
In  this  sense,  houses  are  illiquid  assets,  whereas 
certain  ﬁnancial  assets,  such  as  Treasury  bills,  are 
quite liquid. Of course, sellers of houses generally 
attempt to be patient so that they can obtain some-
thing close to the best possible price, but occasionally 
one ﬁnds houses ‘‘priced to sell’’  by someone who 
has reason to be less patient. The latter case is a ‘‘ﬁre 
sale’’—the sale of an asset at a price lower than the 
price that potential buyers, if they could be identiﬁed, 
would willingly pay. 
Kelly  and  LeRoy  formally  study  the  notions  of 
liquidity and ﬁre sales as manifested in the market for 
the assets of a ﬁrm. The broadest features of the issue 
that the authors identify are relatively straightforward 
to  understand.  If  the  current  owners  are  proﬁtably 
operating the ﬁrm, they may be willing to sell it at an 
attractive price, but they will be in no hurry to do so. 
They  certainly  will  not  sell  the  ﬁrm  at  a  ﬁre-sale 
price. If the owners are currently operating at a loss, 
however, they may be able to ﬁnd buyers who could 
operate the ﬁrm more proﬁtably. The question for the 
current  owners  then  becomes  how  aggressively  to 
price the ﬁrm’s assets. If the possible buyers have a 
wide range of valuations for the assets, then pricing 
becomes difﬁcult. If the owner sets a ﬁre-sale price, 
he or she may quickly ﬁnd a willing buyer and limit 
the  losses.  Setting  a  higher  price  means  waiting 
longer to ﬁnd a buyer who values the assets most 
highly. This tactic is sensible if the higher price more 
than covers the extra losses incurred by waiting. The 
reasoning is sound, but it does not answer the ques­
tion of exactly how various factors affect the price. 
Economists have derived useful formulas describ­
ing the pricing of liquid assets, such as the Black– 
Scholes option pricing formula, but they have found 
that deriving expressions for the pricing of illiquid 
assets  is  more  difﬁcult.  This  paper,  which  extends 
some earlier work by the authors and others aimed at 
deriving concrete implications of illiquidity, is com­
posed mainly of an extended example. The example 
illustrates  why  ﬁre-sale  discounts  occur  in  illiquid 
markets;  it  also  shows  that,  in  such  markets,  the 
ﬁre-sale discounts may be sizable, whereas in liquid 
markets,  a  small  discount  is  sufﬁcient  to  ensure  a 
quick sale. 
MARVIN GOODFRIEND 
Monetary policy analysis is commonly examined in 
the  context  of  models  with  a  greatly  simpliﬁed 
mechanism of monetary transmission. Such models 
ignore the central bank’s control of the money supply 
and focus exclusively on the short-run nominal inter­
est rate for monetary policy. Invariably, such models 
also fail to draw a distinction between narrow money 
(bank reserves) and broad money (bank deposits) and 
rule out, by assumption, ﬁnancial frictions that may 
be important for understanding the role of ﬁnancial 
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In his paper ‘‘Narrow Money, Broad Money, and 
the Transmission of Monetary Policy,’’ Marvin Good-
friend  develops  a  framework  that  integrates  broad 
money demand with loan production, asset pricing, 
and arbitrage between banking and asset markets in 
order to explore the supply of and demand for broad 
money  and  the  potential  role  of  broad  money  in 
monetary transmission. The demand for broad money 
arises  from  at  least  two  problems:  First,  not  all 
markets that agents might want to use exist; second, 
agents  are  subject  to  uninsurable,  idiosyncratic 
shocks.10 Banks hold household demand deposits and 
use  funds  to  make  loans,  subject  to  the  collateral 
available  in  the  economy  and  the  effort  needed  to 
monitor loan performance. Goodfriend shows that the 
resulting macroeconomic equilibrium is considerably 
more  complex  than  that  obtained  in  traditional, 
greatly  simpliﬁed  monetary  models.  For  instance, 
among the standard factors determining the observed 
net  real  returns  on  capital  and  bonds  is  the  time 
10.  For  example,  when  setting  out  on  a  sunny  day,  one  must 
consider that trading one’s bottle of sunscreen for an umbrella may be 
difﬁcult should the weather change. One could hope to ﬁnd a market 
in  which  to  complete  this  trade  or  to  buy  insurance  against  this 
outcome, but carrying money with which to buy an umbrella should 
the need arise may be simpler. 
preference of agents—the rate at which agents trade 
consumption today for consumption tomorrow. But 
the return on capital and bonds also depends on the 
broad liquidity services they may provide as collat­
eral for loans. 
Goodfriend  uses  the  model  to  explore  the  links 
between the broad liquidity services that bank depos­
its provide and the scope for monetary policy makers 
to  use  the  instruments  of  narrow  money  and  the 
nominal interest rate to manage, react to, and take 
account  of  broad  liquidity.  Among  other  things, 
Goodfriend shows how the neutral level of an inter-
bank interest rate policy instrument depends on fac­
tors  affecting  the  provision  of  broad  liquidity.  He 
demonstrates that, although interest rate policy auto­
matically  insulates  the  economy  against  shocks  to 
narrow  liquidity,  such  policy  must  be  modiﬁed  to 
offset the effect on the economy of shocks to broad 
liquidity. In general, broad-liquidity conditions need 
to be taken into account in the pursuit of interest rate 
policy because (1) they inﬂuence the link between the 
interbank rate and market interest rates through their 
effect on the premium ﬁrms must pay to raise funds 
to ﬁnance illiquid investments and (2) they affect the 
behavior of market interest rates that the central bank 
must target in order to maintain overall macroeco­
nomic stability with stable prices. 
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